A. Thomas of Chobham, from the Manual of Confessors
Thomas was a scholastic theologian who studied in Paris at the beginning of the thirteenth century. He was active at a time when the church was beginning to take an active interest in the spiritual lives of the laity, and, indeed, he wrote one of the first, and one of the most widely used, manuals for confessors, which parish priests used and consulted when they heard the confessions of the laity.  What do you find significant in Thomas' discussion of wives and husbands? Note: usury is the practice of lending money at interest; until the late 13th century, this practice was considered illegal and immoral.

1. On whether or not the wives of usurers should be allowed to remain with their husbands, even though it is a sin to derive one's sustenance from the ill-gotten gains of usurers

Some [scholastic theologians] say that the usurer's wife ought to support herself with the labor of her own hands if she knows how to do so, or that she should support herself from the property of her friends.  If, however, she has no friends or she does not know how to do anything, she may honorably withdraw from her husband for reasons of spiritual fornication, just as she would be able to for reasons of corporal fornication. ... However, other theologians are of a better opinion that the usurer's wife is like the Lord, who ate with sinners and plunderers [Luke 19:2-7] and even though they gave him nothing except property that belonged to others, nevertheless, because he attended to the cause of the poor and persuaded the plunderers to restore the stolen goods, he freely ate their food.  In a similar manner, the usurer's wife is able to persuade her husband that he should restore the income from interest or accept a lower interest rate from the poor, and because she thus labors for them and attends to their cause, she is freely able to live from their property.

2. Advice that confessors should give to wives and husbands:

In imposing penance, it should always be enjoined upon women to be preachers to their husbands, because no priest is able to soften the heart of a man the way his wife can.  For this reason, the sin of a man is often imputed to his wife if, through her negligence, he is not corrected.  Even in the bedroom, in the midst of their embrace, a wife should speak alluringly to her husband, and if he is hard and unmerciful, and an oppressor of the poor, she should invite him to be merciful; if he is a plunderer, she should denounce plundering; if he is avaricious, she should arouse generosity in him, and she should secretly give alms from their common property, supplying the alms that he omits ...

And in turn, the confessor should persuade the husband to manage his wife with decent demands, and to exhibit the respect owed as to part of his own body.  And if she is foolish, he should rebuke her moderately and decently, and if there is need, he should restrain her.  For he should employ greater diligence in guarding his wife than in guarding any earthly possession, because nothing should be dearer to him than his wife.

[unpublished translation from Thomas of Chobham, Summa Confessorum, made by Sharon Farmer, U.C. Santa Barbara; used with permission]

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B. St. Thomas Aquinas
The Dominican friar Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) was the greatest theologian of the thirteenth century. The central goal of his theology was to reconcile, or synthesize, Christian doctrine with ancient Greek philosophy and natural science, especially the work of Aristotle, which had only recently been translated into Latin, the educated language of western Europe.  Many of Aquinas' ideas about the nature of men and women were derived from Aristotle's biological writings.  Other of his views about women's roles in society and in the church were simply affirmations of earlier church teachings and practices, which Aquinas tried to support by showing that such teachings and practices were based on the natural order of things.  His massive work of synthesis, the Summa Theologica, was so immediately impressive, and Aquinas' work so pious and practical, that he was canonized very rapidly after his death.  This work shows his method quite clearly.  Aquinas proceeded to group all theology systematically under a series of questions; for each question there would be a series of related points or articles that related to the larger question. Under each article, Aquinas would present a proposition (generally the title of the article), and then proceed to offer a series of objections to that proposition (with textual support), and then the opposing side (ie., "on the contrary ..."). Finally Aquinas would weigh in with his answer.  Taken from The Summa Theologica of St Thomas Aquinas, trans. the Fathers of the English Dominican Province (London: Burns Oates and Washbourne, 1914, 1922), vol. 4, pp. 274-276, 346-348; vol. 19, pp. 51-53.
Notes: ‘The Philosopher' was medieval shorthand for Aristotle; "before sin" means the time before Adam and Eve ate the fruit and were expelled from the garden of Eden (also known as the Fall); the "state of innocence" was what Adam and Eve possessed before eating the fruit.

1. Part 1, Question 92: The Production of the Woman
We must next consider the production of the woman. Under this heading there are four points [or articles] of inquiry: (1) whether the woman should have been made in the first creation of things? (2) Whether the woman should have been made from man? (3) Whether she came from man's rib? (4) Whether the woman was made immediately by God?

First Article: Whether the woman should have been made in the first creation of things?

Objection 1. It would seem that the woman should not have been made in the first creation of things. For the Philosopher says (in his On the Generation of Animals, ii, 3) that the "female is a deformed male."  But nothing deformed or defective should have been in the first production of things. Therefore women should not have been made at that first creation.

Objection 2. Further, subjection and limitation were a result of sin, for to the woman was it said after the fall (Genesis 3:16): "You shall be under the man's power;" and Gregory says that "Where there is no sin, there is no inequality."  But woman is naturally of less strength and dignity than man; "for the agent is always more honorable than the patient," as Augustus says. For this reason, woman should not have been made in the first creation of things before sin.

Objection 3. Further, occasions of sin should be cut off. But God foresaw that the woman would be an occasion of sin to man. Therefore He should not have made woman.

On the contrary. It is written (Genesis 2:18), "It is not good for man to be alone; let us make him a helper like to himself."

I answer that: It was necessary for woman to be made, as the Scripture says, as a helper to man; not, indeed, as a helpmate in other works, as some say, since man can be more efficiently helped by another man in other works; but as a helper in the work of generation [ie., procreation]. This can be made clear if we observe the mode of generation carried out in various living things.  Some living things do not possess in themselves the power of generation, but are generated by some other specific agent, such as some plants and animals by the influence of the heavenly bodies, from some fitting matter and not from seed; other possess the active and passive generative power together; for the noblest vital function in plants is generation. Wherefore we observe that in these the active power of generation invariably accompanies the passive power. Among perfect animals the active power of generation belongs to the male sex, and the passive power to the female sex.  And as among animals there is a vital operation nobler than generation, to which their life is principally directed; therefore the male sex is not found in continual union with the female in perfect animals, but only at the time of coition; so that we may consider that by this means the male and the female are one, as in plants they are always united; although in some cases one of them preponderates, and in some the other.  But man is yet further ordered to a still nobler vital action, and that is intellectual operation.  Therefore there was greater reason for the distinction of these two forces in man; so that the female should be produced separately from the male; although they are carnally united for generation.  Therefore directly after the formation of woman it was said, "And they shall be one in flesh (Genesis 2:24)."

Reply to Objection 1: As regards the individual nature, woman is defective and deformed, for the active force in the male semen tends to the production of a perfect likeness in the masculine sex; while the production of woman comes from a defect in the active force or from some material indisposition, or even from some external influence, such as that of a south wind, which is moist, as the Philosopher observes [in "On the generation of animals," 4:2]. On the other hand, as regards human nature in general, woman is not deformed, but is included in nature's intention as directed to the work of generation.  Now the general intention of nature depends on God, Who is the universal Author of nature. Therefore in producing nature, God formed not only the man but also the female.

Reply to Objection 2: Subjection is twofold.  One is servile, by virtue of which a superior makes use of a subject for his own benefit; and this kind of subjection began after sin [ie., after the expulsion from the Garden of Eden]. There is another kind of subjection, which is called economic or civil, whereby the superior makes use of his subjects for their own benefit and good; and this kind of subjection existed even before the Fall.  For good order would have been wanting in the human family if some were not governed by others wiser than themselves. So by such a kind of subjection, woman is naturally subject to man, because in man the discretion of reason predominates.  Nor is inequality among men precluded by the state of innocence, as we shall prove [below, in Question 96].

Reply to Objection 3. If God had deprived the world of all those things which proved to lead to sin, the universe would have been imperfect.  Nor was it fitting for the common good to be destroyed in order that individual evil might be avoided; especially as God is so powerful that He can direct any evil to a good end.

Second Article: Whether in the state of innocence there would have been generation by coition? [ie., was there sex and conception before the Fall?]

Objection 1: It would seem that generation by coition [sex] would not have existed in the state of innocence. For, as Damascene says, the first man in the Garden of Eden was "like an angel." But in the future state of the resurrection, when men will be like to angels in heaven and will neither marry nor will be given in marriage, as is written (Matthew 22:30). Therefore there could have been no generation by coition in Eden.

Objection 2: Further, our first parents were created at the age of perfect development. Therefore, if generation by coition had existed before the Fall, they would have had intercourse while still in Paradise; which was not the case according to scripture (Genesis 4:1).

Objection 3: Further, in carnal intercourse, more than at any other time, man becomes like an animal, on account of the passionate delight that he takes from the act; for this reason continence [ie., chastity] is praiseworthy, by which man refrains from such pleasures.  But man is compared to beasts by reason of sin, according to Psalm 48:13: "Man, when he was in honor, did not understand; he is compared to the senseless beasts, and becomes like them."  Therefore, before the Fall, there would have been no such intercourse of man and woman.

Objection 4: Further, in the state of innocence there would have been no corruption. But virginal integrity is corrupted by intercourse. Therefore there would have been no intercourse in the state of innocence.

On the contrary: God made man and woman before the Fall (Genesis 1 and 2). But nothing is void in God's works. Therefore, even if man had not sinned, there would have been such intercourse, since the distinction into two sexes presumes it to occur.  Moreover, we are told that woman was made to be a helper to man (Genesis 2:18, 20). But she was not capable of helping man except in generation, because another man would have proved a more effective help in everything else.  Therefore there would have been such generation in the state of innocence.

I answer that: Some of the earlier theological authorities, considering the nature of physical concupiscence as it effects generation in our current state [ie., after the Fall], concluded that in the state of innocence generation would not have taken place in the same way.  Thus Gregory of Nyssa says that in Eden the human race would have multiplied without coition through operation of the Divine Power.  He adds that God made humanity male and female before the Fall, because He foresaw the mode of generation that would take place after the Fall, which He also foresaw.  But this is unreasonable.  For what is natural to man [ie., desire and intercourse] was neither acquired nor forfeited by the Fall. Now it is clear that generation by coition is natural to man by reason of his animal life, which he possessed even before the Fall, as was explained above [at Question 97], just as it is natural to other perfect animals, as the corporeal members make it clear.  So we cannot allow that these members would not have had a natural use, as other members had, before sin.

Thus, as regards generation by coition, there are, in the present state of life, two things to be considered. One, which comes from nature, is the union of man and woman; for in every act of generation there is an active and a passive principle.  For this reason, since wherever there is distinction between male and female, the active principle is male and the passive principle is female; the order of nature demands that for the purpose of generation there should be coexistence of male and female.  The second thing to be observed is a certain deformity of excessive sexual desire, which in the state of innocence would not have existed, since at that time the lower members [ie., genitalia] were entirely subject to reason.  Wherefore St Augustine says, "We must be far from supposing that offspring could not be conceived without desire. All the bodily members would have been equally moved by the will, without ardent or lustful incentive, with calmness of soul and body."

Reply to Objection 1: In Eden man would have been like an angel in his spirituality of mind, yet with an animal life in his body.  After the resurrection man will be like an angel, spiritualized in soul and body.  Therefore there is no parallel [between Eden and the period after the resurrection].

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says, our first parents did not come together in Eden, because on account of sin they were ejected from paradise shortly after the creation of the woman; or because, having received the general Divine command with regard to generation, they awaited the special command relative to the time.

Reply to Objection 3: Beasts do not possess reason. In this way man becomes, as it were, like them during coition, because he cannot moderate lust.  In the state of innocence nothing of this kind would have happened that was not regulated by reason, not because sensory delight was lesser, as some authors claim (rather indeed would sensory delight have been the greater in proportion to the greater purity of nature and the greater sensibility of the body), but because the force of lust would not have so inordinately thrown itself into pleasure, since it would have been curbed by reason, whose place is not to lessen sensory pleasure but to prevent the force of lust from cleaving to sensory pleasure immoderately.  By ‘immoderately' I mean going beyond the bounds of reason, as a sober person does not take less pleasure in food taken in moderation than the glutton, but his lust lingers less in such pleasures.  This is what Augustine means by the words quoted above, which do not exclude the intensity of pleasure from the state of innocence, but [exclude] the ardor of desire and the restlessness of the mind. Therefore continence would not have been praiseworthy in the state of innocence, whereas it is praiseworthy in our present state, not because continence removes fecundity, but because it removes inordinate desire.  In that state fecundity would have existed without lust.

Reply to Objection 4: As Augustine says, in that state "intercourse would have been without prejudice to virginal integrity; this [the hymen] would have remained intact, as it does in the menses.  And just as in giving birth the mother was then relieved, not by groans of pain, but by the instigations of maturity, so too in conceiving, the union was one of deliberate action, not lustful desire."

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Part 3, Supplement, Question 39

First Article: Whether the female sex is an impediment to receiving orders? [ie., whether being female prevents one from joining the clergy]

Objection 1: It would seem that the female sex is no impediment to receiving Orders.  For the office of prophet is greater than the office of priest, since a prophet stands midway between God and priests, just as the priest does between God and people.  Now the office of prophet was sometimes granted to women, as may be gathered from 4 Kings 22:14.  Therefore the office of priest is open to them.

Objection 2: Further, just as Order implies a kind of pre-eminence, so does a position of authority, as well as martyrdom and the religious state. Now authority is entrusted to women in the New Testament, as in the case of abbesses, and in the Old Testament, as in the case of Deborah, who judged Israel (Judges 2). Moreover martyrdom and the religious life are also befitting to them. Therefore the Orders of the Church are also open to them.

Objection 3. Further, the power of orders is founded in the soul. But sex is not in the soul. Therefore difference in sex makes no difference to the reception of Orders.

On the contrary, It is said (1 Tim. 2:12): "I suffer not a woman to teach in the Church, nor to use authority over the man." [The words "in the Church" in the above quotation are from 1 Cor. 14:34, "Let women keep silence in the churches."]

Further, the crown [a distinctive hair-cut] is required previous to receiving Orders, albeit not for the validity of the sacrament. But the crown or tonsure is not befitting to women according to 1 Cor. 11. Neither therefore is the receiving of Orders.
 I answer that: Certain things are required in the recipient of a sacrament in order to make that sacrament valid, and if such things be lacking, one can receive neither the sacrament nor the reality of the sacrament. Other things, however, are required, not for the validity of the sacrament, but for its lawfulness, as being congruous to the sacrament; and without these things, one receives the sacrament, but not the reality of the sacrament. Accordingly we must say that the male sex is required for receiving Orders not only in the second, but also in the first way. For this reason, that even though a woman were made the object of all that is done in conferring Orders, she would not receive Orders, for since a sacrament is a sign, not only the thing, but the signification of the thing, is required in all sacramental actions; thus it was stated above that in Extreme Unction [a sacrament, administered to dying people] it is necessary to have a sick man, in order to signify the need of healing. Accordingly, since it is not possible for the female sex to signify eminence of degree (since a woman is in the state of subjection), it follows that she cannot receive the sacrament of Order. Some, however, have asserted that the male sex is necessary for the lawfulness and not for the validity of the sacrament, because even the Decretals [a collection of papal documents defining and explaining dogma and practice] make mention of deaconesses and priestesses. But ‘deaconess' there denotes a woman who shares in some act of a deacon, namely someone who reads the homilies in the Church; and priestess [presbytera] means a widow, for the word "presbyter" means elder.

Reply to Objection 1. Prophecy is not a sacrament but a gift of God. For this reason, there it is not the signification, but only the thing which is necessary. And since in matters pertaining to the soul woman does not differ from man as to the thing (for sometimes a woman is found to be better than many men as regards the soul), it follows that she can receive the gift of prophecy and the like, but not the sacrament of Orders.

And thereby appears the Reply to the Second and Third Objections. However, as to abbesses, it is said that they have not ordinary authority, but delegated as it were, on account of the danger of men and women living together. But Deborah
exercised authority in temporal, not in priestly matters, even as now women may have temporal power.

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Part Two of Part 2, Question 156

First Article: Does incontinence derive from the soul or the body?

Objection 1. It would seem that incontinence pertains not to the soul but to the body. For sexual diversity comes not from the soul but from the body. Now sexual diversity causes diversity of incontinence: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 5) that women are not described either as continent or as incontinent. Therefore incontinence pertains not to the soul but to the body.

Objection 2. Further, that which pertains to the soul does not result from the temperament of the body. But incontinence results from the bodily temperament: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "it is especially people of a quick or choleric and atrabilious temper whose incontinence is one of unbridled desire." Therefore incontinence belongs to the body.

Objection 3. Further, victory concerns the victor rather than the vanquished. Now a man is said to be incontinent when "the flesh lusts against the spirit," and overcomes it. Therefore incontinence pertains to the flesh rather than to the soul.

On the contrary, The soul provides the chief difference between men and beasts. They differ as well in respect of continence and incontinence, for we ascribe neither continence nor incontinence to the beasts, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 3). Therefore incontinence is chiefly on the part of the soul.

I answer that:  Things are ascribed to their direct causes rather than to those which merely occasion them. Now bodily factors are only an occasional cause of incontinence; since it is owing to a bodily disposition that vehement passions can arise in the sensitive appetite which is a power of the organic body. Yet these passions, however vehement they be, are not the sufficient cause of incontinence, but are merely the occasion thereof, since, so long as the use of reason remains, man is always able to resist his passions. If, however, the passions gain such strength as to take away the use of reason altogether--as in the case of those who become insane through the vehemence of their passions--the essential conditions of continence or incontinence cease, because such people do not retain the judgment of reason, which the continent man follows and the incontinent forsakes.
 From this it follows that the direct cause of incontinence arises on the part of the soul through its failure to resist passion with reason.  This happens in two ways, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7): first, when the soul yields to the passions, before the reason has given its counsel; and this is called "unbridled incontinence" or "impetuosity": secondly, when a man does not stick to thinking out what he should do and only feebly holds to reason's judgment; wherefore this kind of incontinence is called "weakness." Hence it is manifest that incontinence pertains chiefly to the soul.

Reply to Objection 1. The human soul is the form of the body, and has certain powers which make use of bodily organs. The operations of these organs contribute somewhat to those operations of the soul which are accomplished without bodily instruments, namely to the acts of the intellect and of the will, in so far as the intellect receives from the senses, and the will is urged by passions of the sensitive appetite. Accordingly, since woman, as regards the body, has a weak temperament, the result is that for the most part, whatever she holds to, she holds to it weakly; although in rare cases the opposite occurs, according to Prov. 31:10, "Who shall find a valiant woman?" And since small and weak things "are accounted as though they
were nothing" the Philosopher speaks of women as though they did not have the firm judgment of reason, despite instances to the contrary in some women. Hence he states that "we do not describe women as being continent, because they are vacillating" through their insufficient measure of reason, and "are easily swayed" into readily following their passions.

Reply to Objection 2. It is owing to the impulse of passion that a man will sometimes follow his passion before his reason counsels him. Now the impulse of passion may arise either from its quickness, as in bilious persons, or from its vehemence, as in the melancholic, who on account of their earthy temperament are most vehemently aroused. Even so, on the other hand, a man fails to stick to what reason counsels, because he holds weakly to that advice due to the softness of his temperament, as we have stated with regard to woman. This is also the case with phlegmatic temperaments, for the same reason as in women. And these results are due to the fact that the bodily temperament is an occasional but not a sufficient cause of incontinence, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 3. In the incontinent man the lusts of the flesh overcome the spirit, not necessarily, but through the spirit's negligence and failure to put up a stiff resistance.

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